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Ever since the  mid-19th century, Russia’s policies in  the  Pacific have focused 
on  two interconnected tasks: gaining and maintaining the  status of a  Pacific 
power and protecting the country’s eastern territories. There were no continuous 
external threats of losing these territories, and Petersburg’s/Moscow’s interests 
in the region were limited to extracting its natural resources, as well as creating 
a  buffer zone and a  foothold for further eastward expansion. Thus, the  efforts 
to explore and protect the region were intermittent and did not transform into 
a  sustained development strategy. The  Kremlin’s current drive to  the east, for 
the first time in Russian history, has strong economic underpinnings and serves 
to reinforce Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region by expanding its economic 
presence there.
Key Themes
• The Russian state’s policies vis-à-vis the country’s Far East have predominantly 
been driven by non-economic considerations due to the region’s remoteness, 
climate, geopolitical conditions, and sporadic threats to  regional security. 
The government became actively involved in the region when foreign powers 
increased their activity in close proximity to Russia’s borders, which was per-
ceived as a threat to the country’s territorial integrity.
• Russia’s position in the Far East was mainly reinforced through Russian set-
tlements there, fortifications along the  Chinese border, and the  creation of 
military-oriented transportation infrastructure, as well as military and export-
driven mining enterprises.
• Today the  Far East is treated by the  Russian government as a  transit corri-
dor, a raw material base, and a geographic foothold for the drive into the Asia-
Pacific region. However, in  keeping with tradition, the  Kremlin invokes 
threats to regional security to convince the public of the need to redistribute 
some resources toward the eastern part of the country. At the same time, there 
is a danger that the end of the “threat from the East” will result in the end of 
yet another escalation of the government’s eastern policy.
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Recommendations
Russia’s presence in the Asia-Pacific requires a strategy that is consistent with 
regional realities and the country’s potential. A long-term development strategy 
for the country’s eastern territories must also be formulated. It should adequately 
address the relevant internal and external challenges rather than focus on repel-
ling external threats.
The Far East can become a viable platform for Russia’s economic integration 
into the Asia-Pacific only if Moscow starts treating the region as an equal part of 
the Eurasian political and economic space.
3The Kremlin’s current “turn to the East” and its increased attention to the fate 
of the Russian Far East raise a number of legitimate questions as to their essence, 
substance, and possible results. The main question is whether there are grounds 
to say that Russia now has a fundamentally different strategy in the Pacific,1 or 
whether it will present the country and the world with a modification of the old 
imperial policies that are well known to  anyone even vaguely familiar with 
the last 150 years of international relations in East Asia and the Russian Far East. 
To what extent are the past experiences reflected in the new course? How long 
will it last? And what are its possible ramifications?
The answers largely depend on the recognition of the causes 
and motives of this touching concern that the Center is bestow-
ing upon this peripheral region, whose population is two times 
smaller than that of the Russian capital. The authorities and 
analysts have different takes on this question. Some explain it 
by the Kremlin’s intention to provide for the “economic revival 
of Russia, in  which Moscow and Western Siberian oil and 
gas sent to Europe are not alone as engines of growth” 2 and 
to “ensure Russia takes a proper place in the emerging regional 
economic architecture.” 3 Others believe that Moscow harbors 
noble intentions of developing Siberia and the Far East by tapping into the Asia-
Pacific region’s potential.4 Some are convinced that the Kremlin’s increased focus 
on Asia is “a typical manifestation of Russia’s expansionist and great-power aspira-
tions,” 5 predicated upon a wish to strengthen its status as a great Eurasian power.6 
Another group of skeptics is of the opinion that Russia’s turn to the East is clearly 
a bluff, and in reality “Russian policymakers do not want to ‘go East,’ but rather 
to redefine the West.” 7 In doing so, they are not trying to secure their own place 
under the sun but simply “an autonomy within the Western world.” 8 I think that 
even a brief historical analysis of the reasons behind the Center’s sporadic interest 
in the country’s eastern peripheries and the ways and means it uses to solve local 
problems will help us to better understand the essence of the current ”turn” to the 
region and predict its future.
On December 20, 2006, in the latest of many similar decisions, the Security 
Council of the  Russian Federation resolved to  accelerate the  development of 
the  Russian Far East. The  situation in  the  region was described as critical and 
harmful to national interests. Addressing the Council members, Vladimir Putin 
stated that the “decline in the population and deep imbalances in the district’s 
structure of production and foreign economic contacts” and the ineffective use 
of the region’s natural competitive advantages “pose a grave threat to our political 
and economic positions in Asia and the Pacific, and… to the national security of 
Whenever an external threat of losing its eastern 
territories emerged in the past, it became one 
of the most important factors – if not the most 
important one – forcing the Russian Center to 
pay close attention to its eastern periphery.
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Russia as a whole.” 9 That’s a  familiar refrain. Even a cursory glance at  the his-
torical record reveals that the external threat of losing the eastern territories had 
previously been one of the most important factors – if not the most important 
one – forcing the Russian Center to pay close attention to the eastern periphery. 
We will examine the various manifestations of this threat below.
The Historical Dynamics
Russia’s Siberian and Far-Eastern epic, which traces its roots to the 15th century, 
has two distinct major phases. The first, the socioeconomic one, spans the period 
from the  early 16th century to  the first half of the  19th century. Those were 
the years of the mostly chaotic exploration of Siberia (the Far East was explored 
to  a  much lesser extent). Two factors propelled Russia eastward at  that time: 
material gain for the government (revenues from Siberian furs and caravan trade 
with China) and the  energy of the  freedom-loving volunteer settlers. Climate, 
distances, and opposition from Beijing were among the major restraints on set-
tling the region.
The second phase, which can be described as imperial and military-strategic, 
covers the period from the  second half of the 19th century into the 20th cen-
tury. Having entered into a number of treaties with China and Japan,10 and upon 
gaining control over the northeastern Pacific Coast, Russia established itself as 
a Pacific and global power. This stage was characterized by St. Petersburg’s, and 
subsequently Moscow’s, strategic interests, which consisted of trying to expand 
Russia’s “security perimeter,” 11 while also increasing the  country’s influence 
in Asia and protecting its territorial gains in the region.
During the  first phase, European politicians considered East Asia a  back-
water territory, but starting in  the  1840s, the  leading European powers and 
the  United States elevated it to  the sphere of their prime interests, gradually 
forcing stagnating Asian states to open up to the West. Naturally, the Russian 
holdings in the Pacific have attracted the attention of other great powers – pri-
marily Great Britain – beginning in the middle of the 19th century. At that 
time, St. Petersburg first faced the two-pronged problem that Russia has been 
tackling for 150 years: maintaining its status as a Pacific power and securing 
its eastern periphery. 
Numerous attempts have been made every 25-30 years or so since then 
to  address this problem, although they have been occasional and sporadic 
rather than being systematic or planned. In each of these instances, the central 
government had been prompted by escalating military and political tensions 
in  the  Russian East to  pay closer attention to  the region, and had been forced 
into greater attentiveness to  the facts of life in  East Asia and the  Far East by 
an event or a sequence of events that it perceived as threatening Russian holdings 
in the Pacific. Each of these stages had been preceded by time periods of varying 
lengths when the threats had formed and been recognized and assimilated, since 
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a certain amount of time was needed for the  leaders of the country to become 
aware of the threat and to undertake specific measures.12 
In every instance, the Center’s enthusiasm was exhausted after eight to ten 
years. During this period of time, the  danger had passed or subsided and 
the central bureaucracy’s interest in the region weakened. The government then 
turned its attention to  the western or southern regions of the  country, with 
the  Far East returning to  the stage of inertial development. The  state always 
lacked the  means, the  energy, the  time, and the  will to  develop this vast ter-
ritory systematically. Paradoxically, each of the  cycles stood on  its own, and 
the lessons learned in the past were forgotten and remained practically unsolic-
ited in the future.
Soon after Eurasia’s northeastern peripheries were incorporated into the Russian 
state, it became evident that the territory’s natural, political, demographic, and 
economic capacity for self-development is minimal. Its developmental trajectory 
was to a great extent contingent upon (1) the Center’s impe-
rial ambitions; (2) the ideology of the country’s leadership; 
and (3) the state policies – its population’s activities, energy, 
potential, and needs mattered much less. These three fac-
tors were not constant; they fluctuated as the domestic and 
international context changed, but they were key in shaping 
the cyclical nature of the Russian state’s Far East policies, as 
was noted by historians 13 and economists.14 
Meanwhile, Russia’s Eastern Seaboard has always played 
an  important role in  the  country’s Pacific policy. Russia’s 
great power aspirations, reflected in the claims of its politi-
cal elite to dominance over the enormous territory, were one 
of the main factors that has always determined the Center’s 
policy vis-à-vis the Far East, and thus the fate of the region. 
For Russia, large territorial possessions served as “a primary 
indicator of its influence in international affairs.” 15 The territory was conceived of 
not only as the country’s eastern frontier but also as a foothold for farther expan-
sion eastward.
The great power idea forced the  Center to  constantly keep the  situation 
in the East in mind and remind the public from time to time of the territories’ 
importance to Russia, as well as of the need to develop the Far East and strengthen 
the Pacific vector of the country’s foreign policy. However, there was a great dis-
tance between political declarations and theoretical justifications – even if they 
were supported by top-level documents – and practical actions. The mere pres-
ence of this territory within Russia’s borders and its protection cost the state a lot. 
Its exploration and development required much more money, which the state was 
always lacking. Thus, active steps toward the development of the region were not 
taken unless relevant threats were recognized at the top of the political hierarchy. 
After that, special political decisions were made, its financing became a priority, 
The Russian holdings in the Pacific attracted the 
attention of other great powers – primarily Great 
Britain – beginning in the middle of the 19th 
century. At that time, St. Petersburg first faced 
the two-pronged problem that Russia has been 
tackling for 150 years: maintaining its status as a 
Pacific power and securing its eastern periphery.
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and a  slew of economic, military, and socio-demographic changes were imple-
mented. These actions were aimed at strengthening Russia’s position in the Far 
East and fending off real or potential threats to its security.
Setting the pre-1850 period aside, we will focus on the military and strategic 
stage of Russia’s colonization of the Far East. 
Having determined what sparked the  Center’s interest in  the  Far East, we 
can identify the periods of its active involvement in  the  region. There are four 
such periods: 1854-1861; 1896-1903; 1931-1939; and 1966-1975. The first two 
can be described as attempts to secure Russia’s eastern borders through territorial 
expansion. The last two are characterized by efforts to develop and consolidate 
the country’s own territories.
1. The Fight for Amur
By the mid-1720s, the Russian government had recognized the importance of 
the Amur River as “the most convenient route to the Pacific Ocean.” However, 
Russia’s genuine interest in the Amur River region dates back to the late 1840s 
and was directly related to the European states’ active engagement in East Asia. 
The results of the first Opium War that England and France fought against China 
were not Russia’s only concern. St. Petersburg was also alarmed by the English 
plans for colonization of the Amur region. Moreover, it was feared that Russia 
might lose Siberia altogether.
The governor general of East Siberia, Nikolay Muraviev, who assumed his post 
in 1848, expressed such concerns in one of his first reports to Tsar Nicholas I. 
“Many a time have I heard in St. Petersburg that Siberia might break away from 
Russia,” Muraviev wrote. “Your Majesty, I became convinced that this apprehen-
sion is quite natural and not for the reasons believed in the capital...” 16 The gov-
ernor general pointed to the main culprit: the English in the Amur River region, 
who “pretending to be simple tourists or innocuous scientists are gathering all 
the intelligence that the English government needs.” 17
The Crimean War and the  threats to  the integrity of the  Russian holdings 
in Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk Basin forced Russia to take specific action 
in  the East. From 1854 to 1856, Muraviev had sent reinforcements, arms, and 
supplies up the  Amur River for Kamchatka three times, which made it pos-
sible to  repel the  Anglo-French squadron’s attack on  the  Russian Pacific ter-
ritories at  Petropavlosk. After Russia’s loss in  the  Crimean War, an  influential 
faction in the Russian government, represented by Chancellor Prince Alexander 
Gorchakov and Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, called for immedi-
ate steps to strengthen Russia’s positions in the Far East.18 In addition, just like 
the prior English efforts, the American plans to colonize the Amur River Basin 19 
strengthened St. Petersburg’s resolve to  take control of the  region. As a  result, 
the Russian-Chinese Aigun (1858) and Beijing (1860) treaties were signed, con-
firming Russia’s ownership of the Amur River territories.
However, Russia’s eastward drive was essentially over at that point. The tsar’s 
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administration shifted its attention to the country’s internal problems and other 
parts of the world – Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. After Governor 
General Muraviev retired in 1861, the Far East lost an active and influential lob-
byist. In 1867, Russia sold its North American territories to the United States. 
For a quarter of a century, the Far East was relegated to the backburner of Russia’s 
domestic and international politics.
2. The Manchurian saga
The second period of Russia’s active involvement in  the East is distinct and 
tragic in some respects. First, the tsar’s court was unwilling and unable to iden-
tify the real enemy for quite a while. Second, it chose the wrong way to coun-
teract the threats to Russia’s national interests. Finally, it expanded the scope of 
its activities beyond the Russian border. Naturally, the events followed a differ-
ent scenario – in part because the actual development of the Russian Far East 
received little attention at that time.
At the end of the 19th century, the Russian foreign policy establishment saw 
no serious threats from either dormant China or rapidly-developing Japan. Even 
when they perceived a possibility of war, Russian diplomats and military officials 
were entirely convinced Russia would triumph. “If there is a war [with Japan], we 
will no doubt win it,” War Minister Alexei Kuropatkin wrote two months before 
the fighting broke out.20 St. Petersburg was far more afraid of English intrigue and 
the strong American position in China. These fears were further fueled by the esca-
lating tensions with China during the Ili region dispute of 1880, in which British 
diplomats played a significant role, as well as by the British and American activities 
in the vicinity of the Russian border on the Korean peninsula. 
A potential conflict with England and the  lack of fortifica-
tions on Russia’s borders in the Far East, along with the inabil-
ity to maintain continuous army supply lines, forced the tsar’s 
court to consider the idea of building the Trans-Siberian rail-
way,21 which was festively inaugurated in Vladivostok in May 
1891. However, the tsar’s government overestimated its own 
strength and misidentified the  sources of threats, which led 
to  an  erroneous choice of strategy. Just as in  the  middle of 
the  19th century, the  Russian rulers focused on  expand-
ing the country’s territory at the expense of exploring and fortifying the land and 
resources that Russia already controlled. 
The new phase of Russia’s active involvement in the Far East was brought on by 
the results of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, which elevated Japan to the 
rank of the dominant power in Northeast Asia. The tsar’s government commit-
ted most of its efforts and resources to participating in the partition of China, 
the construction of the Chinese Eastern and the South Manchurian railways, and 
the creation of a new foothold for East-Asian expansion in Port Arthur and Dalny 
(Dalian), leased from China in  1898. Nevertheless, the  architects of Russia’s 
The beginning of the Japanese aggression 
in Manchuria in September 1931 caused 
the Kremlin to take urgent steps 
to strengthen the Soviet Far East.
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policy in  the  Far East continued ignoring the  Japanese threat, believing that 
the main danger still came from England. Sergei Witte claimed that the emperor 
decided to  take over Port Arthur and Dalny after he had been informed by 
Russian Foreign Minister Count Muraviev that “… if we do not occupy these 
ports, the English will.” 22 Hotheads in the tsar’s entourage even suggested annex-
ing Manchuria and Korea.
The tsar’s government erred in moving Russia’s defenses beyond its borders. 
Only the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 forced St. Petersburg 
to  abandon this strategy and turn its attention to  fortifying the  Amur River 
region. Here the  main emphasis was placed on  populating the  region with 
Russian settlers. Some steps to  encourage peasant resettlement were taken; 
the construction of the Amur Railroad was accelerated; incentives for the migra-
tion of Russian laborers were created; and steps were taken to develop agriculture, 
trade, and industry.
Despite all of these efforts and the  two-fold increase in  government invest-
ments in  the Far East (from 55 million to 105 million rubles per year 23) from 
1909 through 1914, this period in the history of the Russian Pacific can hardly 
be called particularly active. Too much effort was expended beyond Russia 
proper; Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern railway – not the Far East – con-
tinued to attract capital and resources.24 Besides, after the Russian loss to Japan, 
many in St. Petersburg believed that Russia would have to leave the Pacific Coast 
entirely, which also tempered its enthusiasm.25
3. The Japanese Challenge: 1931-1939
The first period of Russia’s involvement in the Pacific was provoked by England; 
the second one was a response to the actions of England, Japan, and the United 
States, and the third one came about as a result of the Japanese militarist poli-
cies in China. The Japanese aggression in Manchuria in September 1931 caused 
the Kremlin to take urgent steps to strengthen the Soviet Far East. In the fall of 
the same year, the Defense Committee of the Council of People’s Commissars 
made a decision to reinforce the region’s defenses.26 A special committee was cre-
ated in December to develop the plan to reduce the military threat to the region. 
In April 1932, the Far East Navy contingent was established, and in 1933 a deci-
sion was made to reinforce the military infrastructure in the Far East by build-
ing fortifications, airfields, fuel repositories, strategic roads, warehouses, and air 
defense facilities.
The military industry was growing very rapidly. The Far East’s share in the Soviet 
Union’s total economic expenditures was increasing year after year. In  1932, 
the capital construction expenses in the area were 5 times higher than they had 
been in 1928; by 1937 these expenses had grown 22.5 times.27 The resources were 
primarily channeled into the military infrastructure and military industry. On 
April 13, 1932, the Council of People’s Commissars made a decision to construct 
the Baikal-Amur Railroad, designating it as “an object of extreme importance.” 
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In fact, Stalin openly declared that the massive construction 
projects in the Far East were needed to counteract the grow-
ing Japanese threat.28
The population growth and the  changes in  its makeup 
also played an  important role in  the  region’s defensibility. 
The  Soviet migration policy was driven primarily by geo-
political considerations: it sought to  ensure the  security of 
the country’s eastern border by populating it with trustwor-
thy and mobile citizens, who would be ready for the  chal-
lenges of the times. The Chinese and Korean population was 
squeezed out and subsequently deported in 1937-1938; the “untrustworthy ele-
ments” were expelled; and people flocked to the Far East, thanks to the draft and 
Komsomol recruitment. All of these measures resulted in the significant increase 
of the region’s population and its Slavic component (for example, the population 
of the  Khabarovsk region increased by 87.1 percent from 1933 to  1939). Men 
outnumbered women 100 to  72, and young adults (ages 20 to  34) comprised 
41 percent of the total population. The region where individual farmers still pre-
dominated in the late 1920s quickly turned into the land of hired laborers and 
kolkhoz members.29
The Second World War, which broke out in  Europe in  1939, again shifted 
the Kremlin’s attention to the West, but the defense potential created in the Far 
East in  the  1930s and the  palpable defeats suffered by Japan at  the  hands 
of the  Soviet Army in  the  battles of Lake Khasan in  1938 and Khalkhin Gol 
(Mongolia) in 1939 helped to deter Japan from entering the war against the Soviet 
Union.
4. The  Sino-Soviet standoff: 1966-1975
The Center turned to  the region again during the  Cultural Revolution 
in China, when anti-Soviet sentiments reached their peak. It was also the time of 
the war in Vietnam. Beijing’s anti-Soviet rhetoric, accompanied by tensions along 
the Sino-Soviet border, prompted the Soviet leadership to take another close look 
at the Far East. In the spring of 1967, the Kremlin returned to the idea of building 
the Baikal-Amur Railroad. The idea was primarily shaped by military and politi-
cal considerations, with economic expediency taking a back seat. Construction 
began in  1974. In  July 1967 and May 1972, the  Communist Party Central 
Committee and the Council of Ministers adopted two resolutions on the com-
prehensive development of the Far East. Capital investments in the region grew 
significantly.30
Moscow revived the idea of “demographic reinforcement” of the Chinese bor-
der zone. To implement it, 23,900 families were resettled “voluntarily to the col-
lective and state farms in the Khabarovsk, Primorye, Amur, and Chita regions” 
from 1967 to 1970.31 In 1972, the so-called “northern allowances” 32 were insti-
tuted in the southern regions of the Far East and Eastern Siberia in an attempt 
The Center again increased its attention 
to the country’s Far East Region during 
the Cultural Revolution in China (when anti-
Soviet sentiments in that country reached 
their peak) and the war in Vietnam.
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to anchor the population within the Chinese border zone. As a result, that decade 
saw the largest migration increase in the Far East in the entire post-war period – 
1.4 million people moved to the region.33 
The region’s military potential had grown a lot as well. Starting in May 1969, 
fortified zones were erected along the entire length of the Russian-Chinese bor-
der. The border guard contingent at the Chinese border had grown from 10,300 
troops in  1965 to  51,300 in  1970.34 The  number of Soviet ground forces rose 
from about 15 divisions in the mid-1960s to more than 60 divisions by the early 
1980s. SS-20 missiles were deployed.35 The Pacific Fleet “metamorphosed from 
a coastal ‘lake flotilla’ of 50,000 men to the largest and most powerful compo-
nent of the  Soviet Navy, with 150,000 men and 800 ships operating between 
Madagascar and California.” 36 
The end of the Vietnam War in 1975, Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, the sub-
sequent changing of the  guard in  China, and the  improvement of Sino-Soviet 
relations substantially reduced tensions along the Soviet Union’s eastern border. 
At the same time, the Kremlin’s relations with the United States and Western 
Europe deteriorated. In the second half of 1970s, the Soviet leadership started 
losing interest in  the  Far East. In  the  following three decades, the  Soviet and 
then Russian leaders mostly paid token respect to  the Far East. Moscow has 
clearly had other things on  its hands. The regional development programs (for 
the periods 1986-2000 and 1996-2005) were not implemented for the most part. 
In the 1990s, the Far East was practically left to its own devices.
5. More of the Same or an Entirely New Approach? 2006-20(??)
A number of factors suggest that the  increased attention the  Kremlin pays 
to  the Far East today is somewhat different from the  cases described above. 
The  Center was concerned with territorial expansion and protecting the  state 
back then, while now the region’s future is at stake.
Starting from General Secretary Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok speech up 
until today, the  Kremlin’s declared goal for developing the  eastern regions of 
the country is Russia’s integration into the Asia-Pacific. Nevertheless, for a long 
time, no concrete steps were taken to  attain the  goal. Evidently, the  Russian 
bureaucracy, the business community, and the  public were not ready to  once 
again immerse themselves in the problems of the remote East at the expense of 
the  close and familiar West. The  search for other, more effective inducements 
to turn the country to the East brought the Kremlin back to the almost-forgotten 
factor of external threat. 
The subject of the  region’s possible secession from Russia was brought up 
soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The nature of the threat was imme-
diately branded as “Beijing’s nefarious schemes.” 37 But even in the first half of 
the 1990s, the experts also started talking about the harmful consequences of 
the  region’s economic degradation and its infrastructural detachment from 
European Russia, which poses a  threat not only to  the region itself but also 
Victor Larin | 11
to the rest of the country. By the end of the decade “it became clear that Siberia 
and the Far East are not merely synonymous with ‘might’ but represent Russia’s 
future.” “The country’s domestic, foreign, economic, and military policies will 
be increasingly determined” by the direction of the regions’ development and 
its outcomes.38 The appreciation of the Far East’s geopolitical significance and 
the  understanding that it may be lost have slowly begun 
to enter the minds of the country’s political elite. 
In July 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke of 
the threat to the “existence of the region as an  inseparable 
part of Russia.” 39 In  August 2002, he uttered a  sentence 
about the  region’s “enormous strategic importance” for 
the entire country, which may have become essential to the 
future succession of events.40 In November of the same year, 
the Security Council of the Russian Federation was discuss-
ing questions of guaranteeing national security in  the  Far 
Eastern Federal District. Addressing the Council, the pres-
ident pointed out the  reasons behind such close attention 
to  the region, stating that its “serious demographic, infrastructural, migration, 
and environmental problems,… economic imbalances, and social tensions… limit 
Russia’s potential for successful integration into the Asia-Pacific Region .” 41
Thus, the  Russian Pacific’s integration potential rather than the  Center’s 
concerns about the state’s territorial integrity or the life of the region’s residents 
became the driving force for the Kremlin’s decisions on the development of its 
Far East Region. The authorities merely used the talk of security threats and 
losing the Far East as an argument to divert the state’s resources to the region. 
However, this took a few more years, while the Russian leadership was bracing 
itself for decisive action and preparing the political and business communities 
for the turn to the East. The regained confidence of the ruling elites – absent 
in the first decade after the Soviet collapse – strengthened their resolve to act. 
The elites have also realized the importance of the rise of Asia and the repercus-
sions of the growing gap between the pace of development in Russia and China. 
Finally, they have come to  regard Russia as an  “energy power that is indis-
pensable to the global economy” 42 and capable of being effective on the Asian 
markets. 
As was noted above, the  threat to  Russia’s national security was invoked 
at  the Security Council meeting of December 2006 in the run-up to the deci-
sion on the accelerated development of the Far East. This declaration prompted 
some politicians to  talk about “the geopolitical hold” on  the  Far East,43 while 
political analysts were alluding to threats of economic and cultural exploitation 
of the territory by “other foreign legal entities.” 44 Internet publications contin-
ued to  discuss China’s growing demographic and imminent military expan-
sion. Meanwhile, the  state was not concerned with reinforcing its borders and 
modernizing its Pacific defenses; instead, it sought to  create an  economic and 
The Russian Pacific’s integration potential 
rather than the Center’s concerns about 
the state’s territorial integrity or the destiny 
of the region’s residents became the driving 
force for the Kremlin’s fundamental decisions 
on the development of its Far East Region.
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infrastructural platform that would ensure the  country’s integration into 
the Asia-Pacific economic space.
In August 2007, the  Russian government approved the  new version of 
the  program entitled “The Development of the  Far East and Baikal Regions 
Until 2013.” A year later, the  program was supplemented by an  addendum 
entitled “The Development of Vladivostok as a  Center for International 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.” 45 As Princeton University Professor Gilbert 
Rozman noted, “…one corner of the  Russian Far East was poised to  become 
a platform for economic resurgence to help make Russia’s presence known.” 46 
Unlike most of the programs of the past, this one received regular financing, 
which was actually increased, largely thanks to  private sector investments.47 
In December 2009, the government approved “The Strategy of Socioeconomic 
Development of the Far East and the Baikal Regions Until 2025,” which sets 
out to “counteract the potential threat to national security in the Far East and 
Baikal.” 48
At the end of the 2000s, the experts wondered how long Russia’s love affair 
with the  East would last, especially considering the  fact that then President 
Dmitri Medvedev was far more interested in  the  United States and Europe. 
However, it appears that the  events at  the  beginning of the  second decade of 
the  21st century actually strengthened the  Russian leadership’s commitment 
to  the continued “Pacific drive.” The  protracted economic crisis in  Europe, 
the sharp escalation of tensions between the countries of East Asia, the events 
on the Korean peninsula, and the American return to the Asia-Pacific all served 
to revive the talk of the threats to Russia in the Pacific that have to be addressed.
At the meeting of the State Council Presidium in November 2012, President 
Vladimir Putin again formulated the  economic approach to  guaranteeing 
the  region’s security, speaking of the  need for its accelerated sustained devel-
opment “so that these territories develop efficiently and become the  key con-
tributors to Russia’s prosperity and power.” 49 Addressing the Federal Assembly 
on  December 12, 2012, he repeated that Russia’s 21st-century vector of devel-
opment points to  the east, and tapping into the enormous potential of Siberia 
and the Far East provides Russia with an opportunity to take its rightful place 
in the Asia-Pacific.50
The Evolution of Threats: Perception, 
Identification, and Responses
From the moment the Far East entered the Russian Empire, it has clearly been 
the weakest link in the nation’s defense system. Thus, the issue of its vulnerability, 
protection, and preservation has always hung over the Russian leadership’s heads 
like the sword of Damocles. However, the leadership took on an active role only 
after it had concluded that a threat of losing the territories existed.
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The threats of territorial losses served as the  main excuse for the  urgent 
intervention in the Far East in the middle and at the end of the 19th century, 
in the 1930s, and at the turn of the 1970s. The current phase is an exception, since 
the main threat now stems from Russia’s nonparticipation in the Asia-Pacific eco-
nomic and integration processes. But again, the wish to “keep up with other pow-
ers” that fueled Russia’s policies in  the  late 19th century can still be discerned 
in the lofty discourse on integration.
 It is worth noting that the  central government did not actively react 
to  the  warnings of “the yellow threat” that were circulated in  the  early 20th 
century and at the turn of the 21st by the  local politicians 
and the  public in  order to  prod the  capital to  take some 
steps to  contain “the Asian presence” in  the  region. Some 
migration policy projects did incorporate the  idea of con-
taining “the Chinese demographic threat” and encouraging 
the influx of Russians, but little was done beyond that.
The idea of Siberian and Far Eastern separatism, 
on the other hand, has long been a source of apprehension 
for the  central government and amplified the  power of 
the external threat factor. In the 1840s, St. Petersburg offi-
cials considered the danger of Siberian separatism to be quite 
real. It was feared that Russians might become disloyal to the 
crown under the influence of ethnic minorities and foreign-
ers.51 The  special identity claimed by the  Far-Easterners 
clearly bothered the Kremlin during the Soviet era. The sub-
ject of separatism returned in the early 1990s and is still being discussed today. 
The politicians in Moscow earnestly talk of the territories’ possible economic and 
then political drift toward Russia’s Asian neighbors. They express concerns that 
“the accelerated development of the Far East – even in comparison with neigh-
boring Siberia – can increase its already significant autonomy from the European 
part of Russia.” 52 The region’s heavy economic dependence on China, Japan, and 
South Korea encourages reflections on this factor. 
Identification of threats was accompanied by the creation of plans and projects 
to counteract them. The first ones appeared during the imperial era, when the set-
tlement and development of the territories were treated as “a strategic operation.” 53 
In  1861, the  government approved “The Rules of Settlement in  the  Amur and 
Primorye Regions for Russians and Foreigners,” which declared the territories open 
to “landless peasants and the enterprising citizens of all social classes willing to reset-
tle at their own expense.” 54 But there were few takers, and in 1863 the authorities 
stopped supporting peasants who intended to settle in this remote region. In 1909, 
the Committee to Settle the Far East, headed by Prime Minister Peter Stolypin, was 
formed. However, the results here were less successful than in the case of Siberia.55 
The Soviet era programs that addressed the  development of the  Far East 
in 1930, 1967, and 1972 did not differ essentially from each other. Economists 
The protracted economic crisis in Europe, 
the sharp escalation of tensions between 
the countries of East Asia, the events on 
the Korean peninsula, and the “American return 
to the Asia-Pacific” all served as weighty 
arguments to revive the talk of the threats 
to Russia’s interests in the Pacific and 
to undertake steps to overcome these threats.
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have concluded that “they had nothing to  do with eco-
nomic priorities” and were directed exclusively toward 
attaining military and political goals by purely command 
means.56 Soviet policies were always aimed not at the devel-
opment of the Far East Region as such, but at strengthening 
its defense capabilities and the component of its economic 
and human potential that ensured this capability, whether 
it be the fortified zones at the Sino-Soviet border, military 
industrial complex facilities, or a “demographic belt” along 
the border. It comes as no surprise then that the programs’ 
effective implementation was contingent upon the  seriousness of the  threats 
the country was facing.57
The historical context allows us to evaluate the quality of today’s regional plan-
ning – specifically, “The Federal Targeted Program to Develop the Far East and 
Baikal Regions for 2008-2013.” In November 2012, only 28 percent of the targets 
had been met,58 which raises questions about the seriousness of the Center’s com-
mitment to the development of the region. In my opinion, two conclusions can 
be drawn from this. First, Moscow does not seriously think it might lose the Far 
East. Second, it is reorienting its approach in favor of the integration model of 
regional development. Thus, it envisions the Far East as a  foothold for Russia’s 
integration into the Asia-Pacific. In this light, it seems logical that 99.1 percent 
of the costs of Vladivostok’s preparation for the APEC Summit had been covered 
by September 2012.59
One must bear in  mind another important factor that was relevant even 
when the  country’s leadership expressed interest in  the  problems of the  Far 
East: the capital’s bureaucracy, which for various reasons had no personal stake 
in the  implementation of the “eastern projects” and tried to sabotage the deci-
sions made at the top. Dr. Stephen Blank of the United States Army War College 
notes that “while Putin’s power is uncontested his bureaucrats either cannot 
implement his policies effectively or regularly subvert them – both long-standing 
features of Russian history.” 60 Looking back to historical records, we find that 
while Governor General Muraviev was battling for control of the Amur region, 
“few government departments in  the  capital looked favorably upon the  real 
administration of East Siberia.” Prince Chernyshev, the War Minister in Nicolas 
I’s government, even suggested that the  emperor form a  committee to  discuss 
the possible secession of Siberia.61
Among the various means of counteracting external threats was the military 
and defensive buildup that included border fortifications, army reinforcements, 
and the development of military industrial facilities. In addition, the military-ori-
ented transportation infrastructure was developed and the region was populated 
by ethnic Russians. The intensity with which these steps were put into practice 
varied, apparently according to the seriousness of the threats faced and the capac-
ity of the state’s coffers. The 1930s and 1970s saw the highest defensive buildup 
Soviet policies were always aimed not at 
the development of the Far East Region as such, 
but at strengthening its defense capabilities 
and the component of its economic and human 
potential that ensured this capability.
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on the Chinese border, while the defensive measures of the 1850s and 1890s were 
limited to locating Cossack communities and villages along the border.
The infrastructural detachment of the Far-Eastern territories from the metrop-
olis was one of the main reasons for their vulnerability. Naturally, every escala-
tion of tensions on Russia’s eastern borders was followed by the Center’s attempts 
to  remedy this problem. The  first attempt was the  conquest of the  Amur, and 
the  second – the  construction of the  Great Trans-Siberian and the  Chinese 
Eastern railways. Although both of these grandiose projects were billed as com-
mercial ventures, they primarily had strategic importance for Russia. The Baikal-
Amur Railway construction in  the  1930s and 1970s played a  similar role. But 
given that the cycles of the Center’s involvement in the East were rather short-
lived, the problem of the region’s tenuous link to “the federal economic, informa-
tion, and transportation networks” 62 has still not been solved to this day and is 
still seen as a threat to Russia’s national security.
Right from the start, the presence of a Slavic majority in the Far East was con-
sidered extremely important to regional security. Alexander II made the first steps 
in this direction in 1854, a few years before the official annexation of the Amur 
region, by sanctioning the Russian settlement of the left bank of the Amur River. 
In the spring and summer of 1855, a few Russian villages were established there. 
At the turn of the 20th century, a large number of Russians moved to the areas 
of the  Chinese Eastern Railway and the  cities of Port Arthur and Dalny. 
In the 1930s and 1970s, Russians settled en masse along the border with China. 
The current Russian leadership is trying to encourage the same behavior. In early 
2006, the government included the southern areas of the Far East in its program 
that supports the  return of Russian expatriates. In  March 2006, Presidential 
Envoy in the Far East Kamil Iskhakov shocked the public by announcing plans 
to resettle 18 million people to the Far East.63 He suggested that they be settled 
primarily along the border with China.64
. . .
As our study indicates, two factors caused Russia to turn to the Pacific in the last 150 
years. On the one hand, the authorities sought an active role in the region’s political 
life and integration into its economic system; on the other hand, they feared losing 
the country’s Pacific territories. Thus, external factors were critical in both cases. 
The desire “to keep up with other powers” fueled St. Petersburg’s expansionist appe-
tites in the second half of the 19th century, just as it is fueling Moscow’s “integra-
tion motives” in the early 21st century. In turn, the threats the territories had faced 
numerous times from the 1850s to the 1970s prompted the government to enhance 
the region’s defensibility and be more active in East Asia.
The Far East’s strategic significance and its enormous expanses determined 
the essence and substance of Russia’s policies in the region. Strategic, military, 
and political interests steered the Center toward the region’s colonization, which 
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was accomplished through the policy of resettlement, the creation of transporta-
tion infrastructure, defensive buildups, and investment in predominantly mili-
tary-oriented industrial production. These essentially colonial policies did not 
concern themselves with the lives and interests of the local population; instead, 
they sought to maintain and strengthen Russia’s position in the Pacific, as well as 
ensure its security and territorial integrity. This is the model that was employed 
by both tsarist and Soviet governments and is still used by Russian leaders today. 
It treats the local population as a strategic resource that can be utilized to attain 
military, political, and economic goals. Herein lies the  principal impediment 
to  the  effective development of the  region: the  interests of the  state, directed 
at  attaining geopolitical and strategic objectives, contradict the  interests of 
the residents, whose main objective is to enjoy a more comfortable life. 
It is certainly inappropriate to fully equate the state approaches and policies 
toward the Far East during such different and contradictory periods in Russian 
history. Every cycle in which the Center reached out to the East has its distinct 
features related to the level and nature of state development, 
its political system, and the political situation in the Pacific 
and the world at large. However, the general trend is clear: 
the  imperial, the  Soviet, and the  current federal Centers 
have treated the  Far East as a  colony that has to  serve 
the  interests, development, and stability of the metropolis. 
This treatment entailed providing the colony with the bare 
minimum of financial support necessary for its survival. 
Only when critical situations resulting from external actions 
threatened to  deprive the  metropolis of these territories, 
did the central government provide an emergency response 
intended to strengthen the region militarily and develop it 
economically. As the threats disappeared, the Center’s inter-
est in the region immediately waned.
And that’s where we are today. China’s economic, political, and military rise 
in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has triggered yet another escalation of 
perceptions of threat to  Russia’s eastern territories, which have spread among 
Russian politicians, military officials, and rank and file citizens. Thus, Putin’s 
warnings of a threat to the country’s territorial integrity fell on fertile soil. One 
is tempted to conclude that they were not issued based on a realistic assessment 
of the  situation. In  all likelihood, the  regime once again resorted to  a  tradi-
tional model of justifying major decisions through an appeal to external threat. 
Appealing to external threat is also a necessary mechanism in ensuring the “secu-
ritization” of Putin’s foreign policy.65 The needs converge.
As of today, the steps the Center has taken to change the negative developmen-
tal dynamics in the Pacific have not yielded any significant results. The region’s 
population keeps declining. It is falling farther behind China, and its dependence 
on the outside world keeps growing. Besides, if history is any guide, the current 
China’s economic, political, and military rise 
in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has 
become the main trigger for yet another 
escalation of perceptions of threat to 
Russia’s eastern territories, which have 
spread among Russian politicians, military 
officials, and rank and file citizens.
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supply of aid from the Center should run out by 2015, unless the strategic partner-
ship between Russia and China collapses due to someone’s blunder, and Moscow 
will again have to  scramble for enormous resources to  fortify the  Russian-
Chinese border. But Russia is far more likely to content itself with being semi-
recognized as an Asia-Pacific power and, having increased its energy shipments 
to  the East, will return to  its European affairs. Meanwhile, Pacific Russia will 
remain the country’s strategic resource, continuing to play the part of Cinderella 
in Russia’s domestic politics and to bear the brunt of colonial development. Until 
the  next cycle comes… The  Far East can become a  viable platform for Russia’s 
economic integration into the Asia-Pacific only if the Center completely alters 
its stance toward the region and starts treating it as an equal part of the Eurasian 
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